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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: SHOULD A
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER BE SUBROGATED?
Nearly all workmen's compensation statutes provide a method where-
by an employer who has paid, or become liable to pay, compensation to an
employee injured in the course of his employment can recoup these pay-
ments from a third party tortfeasor who caused the injury.' The usual
method is to subrogate the employer to the employee's right of action
against the tortfeasor. The employer, in effect, is reimbursed for the
compensation payments he has made to the employee, and the employee
receives the excess of any recovery from the third party.2
A basic issue arises when the employer's negligence3 has combined
with that of the third party to cause the employee's injuries. The statutes
subrogating employers do not except negligent employers.' The action
against the third party tortfeasor, however, is a common law tort action,
divorced from the compensation act, and carries with it the defense of
contributory negligence. Thus, the issue arises whether a negligent em-
ployer, not expressly excluded by the subrogation provision, is precluded
by his contributory negligence from obtaining reimbursement from the
third party tortfeasor.
The majority5 hold that the employer's contributory negligence is no
1. Only Ohio and West Virginia have no statutory provision enabling the em-
ployer or his insurance carrier to recoup the statutory compensation payments to the
employee. The reimbursement procedure takes several forms. The employer may be
subrogated to the rights of the employee against the third part; e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.061, subd. 5 (1966); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3852 (1955). The employee's rights may be
assigned to the employer: e.g., Longshoreman's & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-13-8 (1963). The employer may have a
lien on any recovery by the employee: e.g., In. STAT. ANN. § 40-1213 (Burns 1965
Repl.) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.22 (Supp. 1965).
2. For a general discussion of the third party action in the workmen's compensa-
tion situation see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW ch. XIV (1961, Supp.
1966); 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT ch. 15 (Perm. ed. 1943, Supp.
1965). For a more detailed study see McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation
Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REv.
389 (1959).
3. This includes negligence for which the employer is vicariously liable, but does
not include the injured employee's negligence, since this is a defense to the action
against the third party. Globe Indem. Co. v. Hook, 46 Cal. App. 700, 189 Pac. 797
(Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
4. A common provision is that of Minnesota: "If the employee or his dependents
elect to receive compensation from the employer, such employer is subrogated to the
right of the employee or his dependents to recover damages against the other party. . .
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061, subd. 3 (1966).
5. For purposes of this discussion, the "majority" includes those courts which have
held that the contributory negligence of the employer does not defeat the action against
the third party nor does it require any reduction of damages. Where the employee
brought the action: Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Milo-
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
defense in the action against the third party, while the minority6 regard
it as a pro tanto defense in that the recovery from the third party is re-
duced by the amount which otherwise would be recouped by the employer
for compensation payments made.
Arguably, an express statutory exception is not necessary to preclude
the negligent employer's recovery, since subrogation is an equitable rem-
edy in which the subrogee's negligence is usually a defense.' The ma-
jority, however, view the employer's right against the third party tort-
feasor as having no resemblance to that equitable remedy; instead, it is
considered as nothing more than "a grant to an employer . . . of the
employee's right to proceed against a negligent third party."'  The em-
ployer, in effect, is assigned a "single cause of action" arising from the
third party's negligence.' Since the employer is deemed to stand in the
shoes of the employee, the sole question of the third party tortfeasor's
liability is whether he is liable to the employee.1" It is held to follow that
sevich v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15 (Dist. Ct App. 1924) ; Wil-
liams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384 (1951); Andrus v.
Security Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 113 (La. 1964); Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51
N.W.2d 566 (1952) ; Royal Indem Co. v. Southern Calif. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137,
353 P.2d 358 (1960) ; Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Odom, 237 S.C. 167, 116
S.F_.2d 22 (1960) ; Clark v. Chicago, M. St.P. & P. R. Co., 214 Wis. 295, 252 N.W. 685
(1934). Where the employer brought the action: Otis v. Miller & Paine, 240 Fed. 376
(8th Cir. 1917) ; Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89 (D. Del. 1957) ; Pa-
cific Indet Co. v. California Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 313 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1938); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Cedar Valley Elec. Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W.
709 (1919) ; Utley v. Taylor & Gaskin, Inc., 305 Mich. 561, 9 N.W.2d 842 (1943).
6. Some decisions have recognized the employer's contributory negligence to be a
complete defense: Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. United States Rosasco, 110 F. Supp. 937
(D.N.D. 1953) ; American Cas. Co. v. South Carolina Gas Co., 124 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.S.C.
1954) ; Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933). Generally, however,
the employer's contributory negligence is a defense for the third party to the extent of
the compensation payments made to the employee: Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366
P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961) ; Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 548 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ; Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953) ;
Essick v. City of Lexington, 233 N.C. 600, 65 S.E.2d 220 (1951). Illinois has reached
a similar result because of a statutory requirement that the employer must be free from
negligence to enforce his right of subrogation. Alaimo v. DuPont, 11 Ill. App. 2d 238,
136 N.E.2d 542 (1956). In Hulke v. International Mfg. Co., 13 Ill. App. 2d 571, 142
N.E.2d 717 (1957), the third party's right to the pro tanto defense was recognized, but
the court refused this defense in the employee's suit. In Blanski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 287 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1961), the federal court followed the Alainw case, supra, but
noted that a 1959 amendment to the Illinois statute eliminated the requirement that the
employer's subrogation rights depend upon his freedom from negligence (ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 172.40 (1966)).
7. See note 21 infra.
8. Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Del. 1957).
9. "Whether this was an intentional omission or an oversight on the part of the
legislature, we do not know, nor can we speculate. The fact remains that there is but
one cause of action, and the employer, or his insurer, is specifically granted reimburse-
ment in this single cause of action." Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Calif. Petroleum
Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 144, 353 P.2d 358, 363 (1960).
10. "The sole test of liability of the third party to the subrogated employer is the
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to permit the third party to plead the employer's contributory negligence
would be to permit "one wrongdoer to plead the fault of a joint wrong-
doer in defense... ."' Thus the effect of the majority's interpreta-
tion of the subrogation provisions is to allow the employer to escape all
liability despite his contributory negligence.
The conflict presented by the application of the contributory negli-
gence principle to this "single cause of action" theory is clearly illustrated
by the position of the Minnesota court. In Thornton Bros. Co. v. Reese,"
the third party tortfeasor was a fellow employee of the injured workman,
and under the applicable statutory provision * recovery from the negli-
gent third party-fellow servant was limited to the amount of compensa-
tion payable under the workmen's compensation act to the injured em-
ployee. Since the action in that case was merely one for reimbursement
of the negligent employer, with the employee having no interest in the
recovery, the court denied relief holding that "although the employer is
subrogated to the rights of . . . the employee . .. , he is not thereby
freed from the legal responsibility which attaches to his negligence. ... "'
When the third party is outside the enterprise of the employer, however,
the Minnesota statute applies the standard subrogation provision and pro-
vides for full tort recovery from the third party tortfeasor." Since the
employee has an interest in any recovery over the amount necessary to
reimburse the employer, and since the employer's negligence should not
defeat recovery by the employee, the Minnesota court has refused to rec-
ognize the defense and has granted full tort recovery from the third
party tortfeasor.Y
Although the Minnesota court is apparently committed to the prin-
ciple that a negligent employer should not be reimbursed, it and other
majority courts, in cases where the action is for full tort recovery, usually
have failed to consider the possibility of splitting the theoretical "single
cause of action" and treating the employer's negligence as a defense only
to his reimbursement. The "single cause of action" theory and its in-
equitable substantive result are sustained, apparently, only because of tra-
ditional acceptance of the theory.
liability of the third party to the injured servant or his dependents, and it clearly is no
defense to the third party's liability for his own negligence to show that another party,
his employer, was also negligent and contributing thereto." General Box Co. v. Missouri
Util. Co., 331 Mo. 845, 853, 55 S.W.2d 442, 445 (1932).
11. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 Fed. 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1917).
12. 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527 (1933).
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061, subds. 1-4 (1966).
14. Thornton Bros. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 9, 246 N.W. 527, 529 (1933).
15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061, subd. 5 (1966).
16. Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952).
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The majority's literal interpretation of the subrogation provisions
of workmen's compensation statutes may be attributable to the fact that
some of the early courts, being reluctant to impose absolute liability upon
employers, 7 might have been predisposed to provide absolute reimburse-
ment to the employer whenever a negligent third party could be found to
bear the loss. Such a predisposition would explain why the majority
view courts, supposedly committed to the fault principle of liability, are
willing to literally interpret subrogation provisions, allowing employers
to escape all liability for injuries caused by their concurring negligence.
The majority position has also been explained on the ground that
even though the workmen's compensation statutes limit the employer's
liability to the employee to fixed compensation benefits perhaps the legis-
latures intended to give the employer the added benefit of absolute sub-
rogation regardless of fault in order to offset his strict liability. 8 As
stated by one of the majority courts, "this is one of the benefits that is
granted to an employer coming under the act and compensates for the
many instances where the employer must pay compensation for an in-
jury for which he would not have been liable at common law."19
The majority view, although it is a literal reading of the subrogation
provision, appears inconsistent with the principles of subrogation as well
as the common law of negligence.
In the absence of an express statutory right of subrogation the em-
ployer could have no reimbursement since there is no common law right
of subrogation against the third party tortfeasor.2 ° Moreover, it is a
general principle of subrogation law that a person whose own negligence
has contributed to his loss should not be granted this right of subroga-
17. Imposing liability upon employers without regard to the fault of either the em-
ployer or the employee is without question a departure from the common law fault
principle and thus subject to a strict interpretation by the courts. In Ives v. South Buf-
falo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), this country' first comprehensive workmen's
compensation statute was held unconstitutional on the ground that imposing liability up-
on an employer without regard to fault was a deprivation of property without due
process. "The statute," according to the court, "judged by our common law standards is
plainly revolutionary" (id. at 285, 94 N.E. at 436) and "plainly antagonistic to its basic
idea." (id. at 296, 94 N.E. at 440). This case offered early indication that workmen's
compensation statutes would generally be subject to a strict interpretation by the courts.
See Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmai's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review
of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57.
18. See note 53 iafra.
19. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 75, 68 S.E.2d 384, 388
(1951).
20. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277 (4th
Cir. 1940) ; McCullough v. John B. Varick & Co., 90 N.H. 409, 10 A.2d 245 (1939). See
Hardman, The Common-Law Right of Subrogation Under Workmea's Compensation
Acts, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 183 (1920).
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tion. A reasonable interpretation of the subrogation provisions would
be that the statute merely gives the employer the right to proceed as a
subrogee against the third party, subject to the defense of contributory
negligence. This interpretation seems plausible in view of the legisla-
tures' use of the term "subrogation" rather than the term "assignment";
the latter would be more compatible with the interpretation that the em-
ployer acquires the employee's cause of action without limitation.
Furthermore, the majority's invocation of the tort principle that the
fault of a joint wrongdoer is no defense is of questionable validity in this
context, since if the third party tortfeasor is held liable for the full
amount of the employee's damages, the jointly negligent employer will
receive a share commensurate with his compensation payments to the
employee. Therefore, while the fault of a joint wrongdoer is usually im-
material to the defendant, it may be quite material to the defendant in
this situation where the joint wrongdoer stands to share in the recovery.
Since partial satisfaction by a joint wrongdoer is usually credited pro
tanto against recovery from a concurrent wrongdoer,2 it might be argued
that in this situation the employer who has paid compensation to the em-
ployee should be considered a joint wrongdoer who has made partial satis-
faction for the employee's injuries." Instead, the majority view treats
the employer's negligence as that of a joint wrongdoer in holding that it
is no defense to the wrongdoer being sued (the third party), but fails
to take the next logical step of holding that the compensation payments
made by the employer are to be considered partial satisfaction by him of
the injured employee's cause of action against the third party tortfeasor.
The minority view has usually been characterized as designed to
avoid the inequity of allowing the negligent employer to recoup his com-
pensation payments for an injury he has partially caused.2" This charac-
terization may be attributable to the argument of counsel for the third
party tortfeasors that subrogation has foundations in equity and that the
subrogee is therefore required to have "clean hands" in order to recoup
his compensation payments. 5 One of the earliest minority view cases
21. German Bank of Memphis v. United States, 148 U.S. 573 (1893); National
Sur. Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 19 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1927) ; W.A. Ellis,
Inc. v. Ellis, 115 Colo. 12, 168 Pac. 549 (1949) ; Akers v. Lord, 67 Wash. 179, 121 Pac.
51 (1912). See also MCCLINTOcK, EQUITY § 123 (1948).
22. Laurenzi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806, 155 P.2d 633 (1945). See PROSSER, TORTS
267 (3d ed. 1964).
23. See Note, 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 571, 574 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Del. 1957);
Note, 33 No=R DAME LAW. 506 (1958) ; 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§
75.22-.23 (1961, Supp. 1966).
25. See, e.g., Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89, 90 (D. Del. 1957).
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illustrates the importance of "inequity" as a consideration.26 It held that
when the employer seeks to enforce his right of subrogation in an action
against the third party tortfeasor "his hands ought not to have the blood
of the dead or injured workman upon them. . . .
A more sophisticated, conceptual argument is developed in the later
minority view cases. In Lovette v. Lloyd" the court pointed out that the
statute provided that the action against the third party tortfeasor is a
common law tort action and that any recovery from the third party be
divided between the employer and the employee..29  Therefore, according
to the court, this is not merely the employee's cause of action, but is to be
considered a cause of action in tort against the negligent third party
"prosecuted in behalf of any person entitled to claim a share in the re-
covery. . . . "" Since the employee is denied recovery when his negli-
gence contributes to his own injury, the employer should be denied re-
covery, according to the court, when he has an interest and is at fault."'
Technically, in the action against the third party, the employer is enforc-
ing his own independent claim for reimbursement as well as the em-
ployee's claim for damages. Consequently, for purposes of his right to
reimbursement the employer does not stand in the shoes of his employee
and his contributory negligence is a defense. 2 And in order to prevent
a double recovery by the employee when the employer is found to be con-
tributorily negligent, the liability of the third party tortfeasor is reduced
by the amount that would otherwise be recovered directly or indirectly
by the employer.
Some support for the minority view is found in a 1911 English de-
cision33 restricting the employer's right against the third party. The em-
ployer's right under the English statute 4 is one of indemnity rather than
26. Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933).
27. Id. at 671, 169 S.E. at 420.
28. 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953).
29. Id. at 668-69, 73 S.E.2d at 890-91.
30. Id. at 669, 73 S.E.2d at 891.
31. Ibid.
32. "[T]he right of redress against the tortfeasor has been extended by the [statu-
tory] provisions to the injured workman's employer, who is accorded a preferential right
to recover, out of the judgment for damages which may be assessed against the tort-
feasor, the amount of compensation he has paid or become obligated to pay to the injured
employee." Marquette Cas. Co. v. Brown, 235 La. 245, 249-50, 103 So. 2d 269, 271
(1958).
33. Cory & Son, Ltd. v. France, Fenwick & Co., [1911] 1 K.B. 114; accord, Cana-
dian Pac. Ry. v. Alberta Clay Products Ltd., 8 B.W.C.C. 645 (Can. 1914).
34. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, s. 6: "Where the injury
for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creat-
ing a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages in respect
thereof . . . (2) if the workman has recovered compensation under this Act, the person
by whom the compensation was paid, . . . shall be entitled to be indemnified by the per-
son so liable to pay damages as aforesaid. .. ."
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one of subrogation. Thus the court was not faced with the need to split
a "single cause of action" for the purpose of denying only the employer's
recovery, since the action was his entirely. The English court, however,
was concerned with whether this right was available to all employers re-
gardless of their contributory negligence. It decided that
The intention of the Legislature, in using these general words,"
could not have been that an employer, who has been a party to
• . . the negligence which has brought about the injury to the
workman, should have a right of action for indemnity against
the [third party tortfeasor] . 3.
In determining whether the action lies against the third party, it
should be immaterial whether the action is merely one for reimbursement
or one for full tort damages. Taking this approach, the English and
Canadian courts have construed the statute so as to exclude the employer's
right where he and the third party have combined to injure the employee.
Recognition of the minority view that the employer's contributory
negligence is a defense may present several procedural difficulties. The
first problem is whether evidence of the employee's receipt of workmen's
compensation benefits from the employer should be admissible in the
employer's action against the third party. In Milosevich v. Pacific Elec.
Ry.,"7 a California case where the defense of the employer's contributory
negligence was ultimately denied, the court noted that the defense is avail-
able to the third party tortfeasor "unless there is some provision con-
tained in the . . . workmen's compensation statute which either directly
or indirectly deprived the defendant of the right to interpose the same.""
Included in the California statute was a provision that specifically ex-
cluded from the trial of the action against the third party evidence of the
amount of compensation paid by the employer. Therefore, according to
the court, even if the contributory negligence of the employer constituted
a pro tanto bar to recovery, "it would be impossible . . . to determine the
amount of the damages which would be barred. . . . "" Since it was
impossible to determine how much the damages should be reduced, the
court refused to recognize the defense and permitted full recovery from
the third party.
The policy basis for excluding such evidence is that it is irrelevant
35. See note 34 supra for the English statute which uses the same terminology as
most United States statutes. See WRIGHT, SUBROGATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION ACTS (1948), for a compilation of all the states' third-party provisions.
36. Cory & Son, Ltd. v. France, Fenwick & Co., [1911] 1 K.B. 114, 125.
37. 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
38. Id. at 667, 230 Pac. at 17.
39. Id. at 668, 230 Pac. at 18.
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to the issue of the third party's liability." However, in a minority view
jurisdiction, where the substantive right of the third party to the con-
tributory negligence defense is recognized, the fact that the employer has
paid compensation and has an interest in any recovery from the third
party is relevant and therefore should be admissible. The California
court's application of the statutory provision for exclusion of evidence in
the Milosevich case was therefore without a rational policy basis in light
of the jurisdiction's apparent recognition of the contributory negligence
defense.
A second procedural issue is whether the employer must be joined in
the action before the issue of his contributory negligence can be litigated.
This was an issue in a California case brought against the third party by
an injured employee.4' It was argued that the partial defense of the em-
ployer's contributory negligence is not available to the third party tort-
feasor unless the employer brings his own action or joins in the em-
ployee's action in order to recover the compensation benefits paid. The
court, however, held that the employer's contributory negligence defeats
his right to reimbursement whether he seeks to enforc it in the action
against the third party tortfeasor or by imposing a lien on any recovery
by the employee;4  the fact that the employer is not a party to the action
"is not a ground for denying to defendants the opportunity to plead an
applicable defence"43 since pleading the contributory negligence defense
does not require the naming of the employer or his insurance carrier as
necessary or indispensable parties. The court reasoned that since the
California statute44 requires the employee to give written notice to the
employer or carrier when he brings his action against the third party
tortfeasor and since they have the right to intervene, they are procedurally
protected and there is no reason to deny the contributory negligence de-
fense to the third party merely because the employer or carrier have not
been joined as parties. "
Since workmen's compensation statutes typically require that the em-
ployer be given written notice of the employee's action against the third
party and that he be permitted to intervene,46 the employer seemingly
40. Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 186 S.W.2d 811 (1945); Pattison v. Highway
Ins. Underwriters, 278 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
41. Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
42. Id. at 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
43. Ibid.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3853 (1955).
45. Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 553 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963).
46. See, e.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAw § 29(1) (McKinrey 1965); Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 102.29(1) (1957) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293 (1966 Cum. Supp.).
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could have no due process objection to the adjudication of the issue of
his contributory negligence in litigation to which he is not a party. Thus
the employer could not defeat the pro tanto reduction of the judgment
against the third party merely by remaining out of the action."7
A third and more difficult problem is presented by the possibility
that the employer will evade the pro tanto defense by inducing the em-
ployee to proceed directly against the third party tortfeasor without first
receiving compensation from the employer or his insurance carrier. Since
receipt of compensation by the employee under the act is the basis of the
employer's right of subrogation, the minority position would seemingly
be undermined in that case because the defense of the employer's con-
tributory negligence could not be raised if the employer had no recog-
nizable interest in the recovery from the third party. As a practical mat-
ter, the employee would probably always claim compensation under the
statute before bringing an action against the third party because of the
delay and uncertainty involved in a lawsuit and because most states no
longer require the employee to elect between compensation under the act
and bringing a tort action for damages.
Conceivably, however, a "loan" by the employer to the employee in
lieu of compensation benefits could be utilized to enable the employee
to bring an action against the third party without filing a workmen's
compensation claim. These so-called "loans" were devised for that pur-
pose where the statutes required an employee to elect either his remedy
against the employer under the act or that against the third party.4" It
has been held that such loans were not compensation so far as the elec-
tion requirement is concerned.4" To prevent its use to undermine a valid
defense of the third party, however, the loan should be viewed as com-
pensation from the employer so that the third party may raise the defense
of his contributory negligence. Indiana's present statute specifically
provides that if the employee agrees to accept compensation or "to accept
47. In the federal courts the issue of the employer's contributory negligence might
be litigated by joining the employer as a party plaintiff. "Although the federal deci-
sions are in conflict, the greater weight of authority holds that a workmen's compensation
carrier, as a partial subrogee, is a real party in interest under Rule 17, whose joinder
under these circumstances may be compelled upon timely motion, under Rules 19 and 21
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F.
Supp. 692, 695 (W.D. Mich. 1957). The Indiana statute, IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1213
(Burns 1965 Repl.), however, has been interpreted by the federal courts as not making
the employer or carrier a "partial subrogee" until after recovery by the employee, when
the employer's lien attaches, and thus it has been held that before judgment against the
third part, the employer or carrier is not a real party in interest and cannot be compelled
to join. Strate v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 160 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ind. 1958);
Race v. Hay, 28 F.R.D. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
48. See Note, 48 Gao. UJ. 761 (1960).
49. Pentecost Const. Co. v. O'Donnell, 112 Ind. App. 47, 39 N.E.2d 812 (1942).
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from the employer . . by loan or otherwise, any payment on account
of such compensation" the employer shall have a lien upon any recovery
from the third party."° Thus, assuming that where the pro tanto defense
is recognized it would be available whenever the employer had an interest
in any recovery by the employee against the third party, it arguably would
be available where the employer had made a loan to enable the employee
to proced directly against the third party.
The possibility, however remote, that the employee and employer
might subvert the pro tanto defense of the employer's contributory negli-
gence by having the employee proceed directly against the third party
without first receiving compensation payments could be met by allowing
the third party some form of contribution which would be available re-
gardless of whether the employee had received compensation under the
statute.5'
A majority of jurisdictions have held that the third party has no
right to contribution from an employer who is covered by workmen's
compensation." - Their reasoning is that contribution is unavailable be-
cause of the exclusive remedy provisions 3 of the workmen's compensa-
tion statutes which deny the employee any common law right of action
against the employer and thus limit the employer's liability to the amount
of compensation payments prescribed. Since the employer and the third
party are not under a common liability to the injured employee,"' it is held
50. IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1213 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
51. In several early California cases where the third party sought to raise the em-
ployer's contributory negligence as a defense in the subrogation action, the courts held
that to deny the employer recovery would be forcing him to bear part of the burden of
the employee's compensation and thus equivalent to the third party securing contribution
from the employer. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950) ;
Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, Ltd., 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 313
(Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Milosevich v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15
(Dist. Ct. App. 1924). Prior to California's adoption of the Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors' Act (CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. §§ 875-80 (Cum. Supp. 1966)) in 1957 there
could 'be no contribution.
52. Employers Mut Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179 (Ky.
App. 1955). See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957), for a collection of cases.
53. Two common provisions are: "No common law or statutory right to recover
damages for injury or death sustained by any employee, other than the compensation
herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of
this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives
of his estate, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury." ILL.
R v. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1966 Cum. Supp.). "The liability of an employer pre-
scribed by this chapter is exclusive and in place of any other liability to such employee,
his personal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child, dependent, next of kin,
or other person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury or death." MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (1966).
54. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950);
Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946). Contra, American Dist. Tel. Co.
v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950).
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that the employer cannot be a "common law tortfeasor as to the em-
ployee" so as to give the third party a right of contribution.5
The counter argument has been that the compensation statutes regu-
late the relations between the employer and the employee and have no ef-
fece upon the third party's liability or remedies.56  Professor Larson ar-
gues that the exclusive remedy provision should be interpreted as pre-
cluding only other remedies of the employee or his dependents and not as
precluding the remedy of the third party who is not limited by the work-
men's compensation statute.57 This is the proper interpretation, accord-
ing to Larson, because the purpose of the provision limiting the em-
ployer's liability is to compensate for imposing absolute liability on him,
and since no similar limit has been placed on the liability of the third
party, his action for contribution should not be deemed to violate this
immunity of the employer. 8
This position is reflected in a Pennsylvania decision which held that
the third party is entitled to recover contribution from the negligent em-
ployer." The exclusive remedy provision of the subrogation statute re-
tains its effect, however, since the employer's liability for contribution is
limited to the extent of his liability to the employee under the compensa-
tion statute, 60 which limitation seems to be the only real reason for the
exclusive remedy provision.
Limited contribution seems to be an appropriate means of preventing
circumvention of the pro tanto defense. The exclusive remedy provisions
expressly provide that the employer shall be liable only for the compensa-
tion prescribed by the statute. It can be argued that to allow a third
party who has been held liable for the full amount of the employee's
damages to recover from the employer (who in effect has paid nothing)6"
to the extent of the statutorily prescribed compensation payments due the
employee does not violate the exclusive remedy provision since the em-
ployer's liability remains limited to that amount provided by the statute.
Limited contribution, in effect, produces the same result as recognition
of the employer's contributory negligence as a partial defense. In each
55. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 75, 68 S.E.2d 384, 388
(1951).
56. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.52 (1961, Supp. 1966).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
60. Ibid. See McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study
of the Liabilities and Rights of Aon-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 389, 438 (1959).
61. Assuming the employee brought the action against the third party after receiv-
ing compensation under the act, the employer has been reimbursed if the pro tanto de-
fense has not operated to reduce the employee's recovery from the third party; if it has,
then it is presumed that the third party would be denied contribution.
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instance the employer pays the statutory compensation due the employee,
and the third party accounts for the difference between this amount and
the amount of the common law tort damages found against him. In either
case the result is consistent with the purpose of workmen's compensation
acts, which is to provide the employee with immediate and certain relief
and to limit the employer's liability to the extent prescribed by the statute.
The minority's emphasis of the inequity of permitting the employer
to profit from his own wrong can be criticized to the extent that it em-
phasizes moral fault where fault may not be relevant to the issue at hand,
i.e., how to allocate the burden of work-connected injuries. Furthermore,
the employer may not be profiting from his "own" wrong since the actual
fault may rest with a co-worker of the injured workman and the em-
ployer may be considered negligent only because of the principle of
respondeat superior. Thus there may be some justification for the ma-
jority's view that the fault of the employer is immaterial, although the
reason they advance for that position (that the negligence of a joint
wrongdoer is immaterial to the wrongdoing defendant)"2 is inapplicable
when the joint wrongdoer would otherwise share in the recovery.
One argument against contribution, which the majority courts have
not made, is that the issue of the employer's negligence should not be
raised in the action against the third party since there was no issue of
fault in the first instance when the employer was required to compensate
the injured employee. However, the third party tortfeasor's liability is
predicated upon fault, and it may be questioned whether he should be
deprived of a defense that would otherwise be available to him. It is
arguable that although the employer is not to be considered a tortfeasor
in relation to the employee, he should be considered a joint tortfeasor who
has made partial satisfaction to the injured workman as far as the third
party is concerned. Therefore, any common law recovery from the third
party tortfeasor should be reduced by the amount of compensation paid
or payable by the employer. Similarly, if the employee entitled to statu-
tory compensation from the employer chose to proceed only against the
third party, the latter should be 'entitled to contribution from the em-
ployer to the extent of the employer's statutory liability to the employee.
The suggestion that the fault principle has relevance in workmen's
compensation may seem contradictory in light of the earlier observation
that the employer may not really be at fault in these situations. How-
ever, as Larson has pointed out, every loss-adjusting system must have
two aims: (1) to compensate the injured, and (2) to seek out the true
62. See notes 22 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
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wrongdoer whenever possible." After the employee has been compen-
sated by the employer the courts must return to the fault principle in
order to place the burden where it should be." This then is the reason
for the subrogation provision-the employer who has been required to
pay compensation because of the negligence of another person should be
entitled to reimbursement from that third person. But an employer who
has been negligent himself should not be permitted to shift the entire
burden to the third party tortfeasor. Although the employer may not be
personally at fault, it is sufficient that he be chargeable with negligence:
respondeat superior is part of the fault principle to which the legislatures
have subjected both the third party and the employer when the latter
seeks reimbursement.
When the employer is chargeable with negligence there seems to be
no sound reason why he or his insurance carrier should be relieved of all
liability for the employee's injuries and allowed to place the entire bur-
den upon the third party tortfeasor. Until legislatures provide a more
rational scheme for distributing the loss where the employer and a third
party combine to injure the employee, recognition of the partial defense
of the employer's contributory negligence or recognition of limited con-
tribution by the employer would not only observe the purpose of work-
men's compensation, but would also preserve the common law fault prin-
ciple of the third party tort action.
63. See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 71.10 (1961, Supp. 1966).
64. Ibid.
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